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The Rust programming language is widely credited with eliminating entire classes of memory-safety and concurrency vulnerabilities, but the security implications of adopting it in practice extend well beyond memory safety. This paper presents a critical review of prior work on Rust's security posture in industrial settings, and extends that analysis in a direction the original study did not cover: backend web development. We first assess the strengths and limitations of the existing vulnerability classification of Rust against C, C++, and Java under the SANS Top 25, OWASP Top 10, and the 19 Deadly Sins of Software Security frameworks, identifying gaps including limited empirical validation, a small interview sample, and the absence of a secure development lifecycle discussion. We then contribute an original comparison of Rust against Node.js and Django using the same three-level classification (Rare and Difficult, Safeguarded, Unprotected), supported by side-by-side code experiments for out-of-bounds writes (CWE-787), use-after-free (CWE-416), and race conditions (CWE-362). Our results indicate that Rust's compile-time guarantees dominate at the systems layer, while managed backend frameworks offer stronger built-in defenses at the application layer, suggesting that Rust adoption in web contexts requires complementary safeguards rather than reliance on language-level safety alone.

High-performance GPU programming has traditionally forced a compromise between execution efficiency and memory safety. While Rust guarantees compile-time memory safety for host CPUs via its strict ownership model, applying these constraints to massively parallel GPU execution environments has previously mandated either vendor-locked Domain-Specific Languages (DSLs) or escaping to explicit unsafe raw pointers. This paper presents a zero-overhead, multi-vendor GPU compilation framework built natively into the Rust compiler (rustc) and LLVM backends. We leverage Rust's rich type system, ownership system, and strict aliasing guarantees (noalias) to efficiently manage and optimize data transfers through LLVM's Offload infrastructure. We expose the technical challenges of cross-vendor ABI lowering mismatches between Host and Device targets and introduce a two-pass compilation pipeline capable of safely handling both manual and compiler-generated memory movements. Evaluating our framework on RAJAPerf demonstrates that our rustc-based solution can generate competitive LLVM IR for GPU kernels, achieving a solid kernel performance against native, hand-optimized CUDA and HIP C++ baselines.

Translating C code into safe, idiomatic Rust is a longstanding software-engineering goal because it can eliminate entire classes of memory-safety vulnerabilities while preserving the functional behavior of legacy systems. Large language models (LLMs) have shown promise for this task but typically underperform when applied off-the-shelf, since general-purpose pretraining rarely emphasizes idiomatic Rust generation, cross-language semantic equivalence, or the ability to reason about and repair compiler/runtime feedback. In this report we describe a three-stage fine-tuning curriculum applied to Qwen3-27B that is designed to progressively specialize the model for the C-to-Rust (C2Rust) translation task: (1) continued pretraining on Rust-centric corpora to strengthen the model's prior over idiomatic Rust syntax and standard-library usage; (2) supervised fine-tuning (SFT) on the microsoft/Verus_Training_Data dataset to instill debugging and self-repair behavior over Rust code; and (3) task-specific SFT on paired C/Rust solutions derived from LeetCode problems to teach direct semantic translation. We evaluate the resulting model using the agentic, static-analysis-guided verification framework of SACTOR, which performs structure-aware, two-phase (unidiomatic to idiomatic) translation with foreign-function-interface (FFI)-based end-to-end (E2E) testing. We report success rate, idiomaticity (Clippy lint counts, unsafe-code fraction), and failure-mode analyses, and compare our fine-tuned model against baseline Qwen3-27B and other LLMs evaluated under the same framework.

View PDF HTML (experimental) Abstract:GNU core utilities (coreutils) is a crucial package in modern UNIX systems. It comprises around 100 fundamental commands---like ls, cp, and cat---which run every day on millions of computers. However, G...

Basin is a numerical optimization library for the Rust programming language. Numerical optimization is the task of finding the inputs that minimize a function, and it is a fundamental element across the sciences: fitting a model to data, calibrating a simulation, training a machine learning model, or choosing engineering parameters that minimize cost. Basin gives users a single, consistent way to both state and solve such problems, with a broad catalog of solvers and first-class support for constraints.

Information flow analysis is the de facto method of assessing confidentiality and integrity issues. However, the widespread adoption of information flow analysis in real-world systems is still lacking, partly due to a fundamental gap between theory and practice: the dynamic nature of security concerns in real-world systems goes beyond the scope of existing techniques that assume a static policy (i.e., data secrecy does not change). Recognizing the fundamental gap, a substantial amount of research has studied various aspects of it (e.g., enabling declassification, endorsement, and invocation policies). A recent work takes a step further by formalizing a promising end-to-end policy called dynamic release that unifies prior formalizations by allowing information flow restrictions to downgrade and upgrade in arbitrary ways. However, how to soundly enforce the powerful dynamic release policy is still an open question. In this paper, we present the first type system that enforces dynamic release policy and formally prove its soundness. More specifically, we (1) formalize a core language that enables dynamic release policy, (2) develop a type system that checks dynamic release policy, (3) develop new proof techniques and formally prove that the type system enforces dynamic release policy, and (4) implement a prototype of the type system as an extension to the Rust language, along with case studies on conference reviewing system and Civitas.

Information flow analysis is the de facto method of assessing confidentiality and integrity issues. However, the widespread adoption of information flow analysis in real-world systems is still lacking, partly due to a fundamental gap between theory and practice: the dynamic nature of security concerns in real-world systems goes beyond the scope of existing techniques that assume a static policy (i.e., data secrecy does not change). Recognizing the fundamental gap, a substantial amount of research has studied various aspects of it (e.g., enabling declassification, endorsement, and invocation policies). A recent work takes a step further by formalizing a promising end-to-end policy called dynamic release that unifies prior formalizations by allowing information flow restrictions to downgrade and upgrade in arbitrary ways. However, how to soundly enforce the powerful dynamic release policy is still an open question. In this paper, we present the first type system that enforces dynamic release policy and formally prove its soundness. More specifically, we (1) formalize a core language that enables dynamic release policy, (2) develop a type system that checks dynamic release policy, (3) develop new proof techniques and formally prove that the type system enforces dynamic release policy, and (4) implement a prototype of the type system as an extension to the Rust language, along with case studies on conference reviewing system and Civitas.

Fuzzing Rust library APIs requires constructing well-typed, compilable call sequences that satisfy ownership rules, generic parameters, and trait bounds; existing tools ignore these constraints or use shallow heuristics, yielding low coverage. We present GRAFT, which extracts structured API information from Rust documentation, builds an API dependency graph via recursive generics-aware type matching, and uses topology-guided traversal plus LLM synthesis with compiler-error feedback to produce compilable fuzz targets. On 13 crates from crates.io, GRAFT achieves 80.75% macro-average API coverage at 96.19% compilation success, outperforming RULF and RPG by 4.76x and 2.43x, and reaching 1.41x the average API coverage of deepSURF on crates with unsafe-reaching APIs.

GPU language comparisons are almost always run on tiled dense linear algebra, where every toolchain is good and the differences are small. We implement the same hash-blocked TSDF fusion kernel in CUDA C++, in Rust through NVIDIA's cuda-oxide, and in Triton, and measure it on a workload with the opposite character: an open-addressed hash table with compare-exchange insertion, data-dependent per-lane probe depth, and contended scatter. The result is a split. On the regular stage, which walks a truncation band and accumulates, all three languages land within a small factor of each other. On the irregular stage, which probes and inserts, Rust stays close to hand-written CUDA C++ while Triton is more than an order of magnitude slower. Language choice is nearly free on the work that is usually benchmarked and expensive on the work that is not. We attribute both gaps to specific things the languages cannot express, not to ratios. Triton's cost follows from a probe loop that must run to a compile-time bound and from tl.atomic_cas taking no mask, which forces a scratch structure with no counterpart in CUDA. Rust's cost was invisible in every instruction count: its kernel issues fewer instructions, fewer compare-exchanges and fewer registers at identical occupancy, yet was slower. Hardware counters located it in L1 residency. A GPU-scope atomic load must be coherent across SMs, no NVIDIA L1 is, so the type-correct way to read a shared location bypasses the cache on every access. Triton's bounded probe is also a correctness problem for fusion: at load factors an ordinary depth trajectory reaches, it silently discards blocks and the reconstruction loses patches of surface with nothing reported. We also report a defect found and fixed in cuda-oxide itself, now merged upstream: its scoped atomic load and store could not be called at all in the build mode that produces real kernels.

GNU core utilities (coreutils) is a crucial package in modern UNIX systems. It comprises around 100 fundamental commands---like ls, cp, and cat---which run every day on millions of computers. However, GNU coreutils is also legacy software, with its C codebase dating back to the early 1990s and arguably feature-complete. If one were to consider reimplementing this essential package, how would they do so effectively, and why? This paper recounts the development of Rust coreutils, a contemporary open source reimplementation of GNU coreutils in the Rust programming language, which has reached the status of a drop-in replacement for GNU coreutils, compatible with most Linux distributions. By comparing Rust coreutils with its ancestor, we offer insights into creating a reliable substitute for critical software and highlight how modern programming features can attract development interest in legacy packages.

Modern critical software infrastructure is largely written in C. Since C lacks memory safety, researchers are investigating automatic translation of C to safer languages like Rust. But real-world C software consists of more than just C code, often using named code fragments called macros which are not part of the C language proper. State-of-the-art techniques avoid translating macros by preprocessing C code first before translating it. But this approach produces translations that are dissimilar to the original C code, because preprocessing inlines all macro definitions. To preserve macro usage in translated code, we study the language features that macros and C share and distill them into the first formally-specified translator, MerC. To evaluate MerC, we introduce the first macro translation benchmark, MacroBench, with test cases based on macros randomly sampled from real-world C programs. We find that MerC supports 50% of MacroBench's macro test cases. We also use MacroBench to evaluate how effective large language models (LLMs) are at performing the previously-unstudied task of macro translation. LLMs translate 22% to 77% more of MacroBench than MerC, but with 8% and 28% of these translations being incorrect translations requiring additional validation by developers. In contrast, MerC only produces correct translations. Our key insight is that running MerC first then using LLMs on the remainder reaps greater benefits than using either technique alone. This tag team approach has an average failure rate 32% lower than that of LLMs, while also translating an average of 51% more test cases than MerC.

Modern critical software infrastructure is largely written in C. Since C lacks memory safety, researchers are investigating automatic translation of C to safer languages like Rust. But real-world C software consists of more than just C code, often using named code fragments called macros which are not part of the C language proper. State-of-the-art techniques avoid translating macros by preprocessing C code first before translating it. But this approach produces translations that are dissimilar to the original C code, because preprocessing inlines all macro definitions. To preserve macro usage in translated code, we study the language features that macros and C share and distill them into the first formally-specified translator, MerC. To evaluate MerC, we introduce the first macro translation benchmark, MacroBench, with test cases based on macros randomly sampled from real-world C programs. We find that MerC supports 50% of MacroBench's macro test cases. We also use MacroBench to evaluate how effective large language models (LLMs) are at performing the previously-unstudied task of macro translation. LLMs translate 22% to 77% more of MacroBench than MerC, but with 8% and 28% of these translations being incorrect translations requiring additional validation by developers. In contrast, MerC only produces correct translations. Our key insight is that running MerC first then using LLMs on the remainder reaps greater benefits than using either technique alone. This tag team approach has an average failure rate 32% lower than that of LLMs, while also translating an average of 51% more test cases than MerC.

Rust is a popular systems programming language that provides strong memory safety and introduces low-performance overhead. While Rust guarantees memory safety through strict security policies, such as ownership, memory bugs can still occur in unsafe-related Rust codes where these policies are not fully enforced. Although such unsafe Rust code accounts for only a small portion of the entire code (e.g., 10%), existing approaches fuzz the entire code-including safe Rust, whose memory safety is already enforced by the Rust compiler-resulting in inefficient use of fuzzing resources. In this paper, we propose RustGo, the new Rust-directed greybox fuzzer that effectively and fairly focuses on code regions potentially containing memory bugs. For this, RustGo automatically identifies potential memory bug targets and accurately prunes the paths irrelevant to each target by leveraging Rust-specific static analysis. For each identified target, RustGo includes a new fuzzing approach that maintains an independent state and applies dynamic pruning to maximize balanced and focused fuzzing. We evaluate RustGo on various real-world Rust applications. On average, RustGo prunes 78.49% of irrelevant paths, reaches targets x 2.09 to x 5.08 faster than existing fuzzers, and identifies 13 unknown bugs (six assigned RUSTSEC IDs and one assigned CVE ID).

C underpins operating systems, embedded platforms, and network infrastructure because its abstractions map directly to machine behaviour. Its explicit memory model, predictable data representations, and minimal runtime allow compilers to generate fast, deterministic code. These properties also leave correctness and memory safety entirely to the programmer, making undefined behaviour, pointer misuse, and lifetime errors persistent sources of defects and security vulnerabilities in long-lived C codebases. Rust eliminates most of failure modes through a static ownership and borrowing model that enforces memory safety and aliasing constraints at compile time. However, mature C systems cannot be translated directly: implicit layout assumptions, aliasing patterns, and undefined behaviour must be reconstructed before safe Rust can be produced. This paper presents a migration methodology that first generates a semantics-preserving, non-idiomatic Rust baseline and then incrementally rewrites it into idiomatic Rust using agentic AI, validating each step through compilation and behavioural testing. Applied to iodine (12.5k SLOC), the approach demonstrates that reliable C-to-Rust migration is a structured transformation workflow rather than a single translation step.

Type safety has traditionally rested on carefully crafted type systems, under the motto "well-typed programs cannot go wrong". Modern demands push type systems past this basic guarantee: toward memory safety (e.g., Rust), stronger data-structure invariants (e.g., GADTs), and broader typability (e.g., MLstruct). The motto absorbs each such property by enlarging the set of states deemed "wrong", but collapses them into one binary verdict: heap ownership, flow-sensitive changes to a variable's type, and the gap between a recoverable and a fatal error are relational, stateful facts about intermediate states that one verdict cannot tell apart. Worse, each demand typically brings its own extension, making it hard to say what each guarantees or how they combine. Floyd-Hoare logic supplies a unified foundation. We present a framework for type-safety verification built from four ingredients: (i) case specifications for path-sensitive typing; (ii) separation types, inspired by separation logic, for flow-sensitive type mutation and must-aliasing; (iii) a disciplined distinction between Err (runtime error values our types track) and Abrt (compile-time errors), yielding the refined motto well-typed programs must never abort; and (iv) type predicates for data-structure invariants. Since all four are ordinary types in one Boolean algebra rather than separate extensions, the framework subsumes both GADTs and liquid types within one type logic, spanning weak specifications that tolerate Err to strong ones that eliminate it. Subtyping reduces to one decidable emptiness test, so a single lightweight procedure serves the whole framework with no SMT oracle in its trusted base. We formalise the Hoare rules and prove soundness in a machine-checked Lean mechanisation; by proof reflection it yields a self-certifying type-checker, evaluated on a benchmark suite.

Rust's ownership model and type system offer strong memory safety guarantees, but unsafe code and runtime panics still present significant risks. Formal verification is essential to ensure memory safety, but developing verification harnesses remains a challenging and manual task. Although large language models (LLMs) have shown strong performance in various code analysis tasks, directly applying them to harness generation often results in inaccurate API invocations, inefficient nondeterministic data generation, and fabricated fixes. In this paper, we present HarnessLLM, an automated workflow that leverages LLMs to generate verification harnesses for Rust code directly from existing test suites. HarnessLLM automatically extracts calling scenarios from test cases, generates nondeterministic arguments based on dependency analysis, and incrementally synthesizes harnesses. It then iteratively refines the harnesses, preserving critical code regions and reporting fabricated types or functions to LLMs for correction. In our evaluation on 9 real-world Rust codebases, HarnessLLM extracted 294 calling scenarios from 494 test cases with 94.66% precision and generated harnesses for all scenarios in an average of 145 seconds each. It outperformed the existing approach, Autoharness, which succeeded on only 41% of those scenarios. Finally, 6 real-world memory safety bugs were detected using the generated harnesses, demonstrating the practical utility of our approach in verification. To our knowledge, this is the first work to use LLMs for generating harnesses aimed at memory safety verification in real-world Rust projects.

Rust's ownership and type system provide strong memory safety guarantees, but unsafe code still presents memory safety risks. Formal verification is crucial for ensuring memory safety, but writing precise specifications for unsafe Rust is challenging and largely manual. Large language models (LLMs) have shown promise in generating formal specifications but are often code-centric, prone to inheriting implementation flaws, and lack systematic quality assessment. In this paper, we present KaPilot, a multi-agent framework for automatically generating specifications to verify unsafe Rust memory safety using Kani. The process begins with lightweight program analysis and proof harness generation. The SafetyReq agent extracts a concise, refined list of safety requirements from the target Rust function's documentation, which guides the SpecGenerate agent in producing initial specifications that specify memory safety concerns. Then, the specifications are iteratively refined through a generate-precheck-verify loop involving SpecGenerate, SpecPrecheck, and SpecVerify agents, which assess quality and feed errors back. By executing this loop multiple times, KaPilot generates a set of candidate specifications. Finally, the shuffle-and-implication strategy is applied to systematically determine the best specification from these candidates. We evaluated KaPilot on 54 unsafe Rust functions with ground truth and 70 without. KaPilot achieved 88.9% and 71.4% specification generation success, respectively, with 57.4% of generated specifications equivalent to or stronger than the ground truth. Compared with AutoSpec, KaPilot produces 14.8% more verifiable specifications and 25.9% more equivalent-or-better specifications.

The migration of legacy C programs to Rust has become an important direction for improving software memory safety while alleviating the high cost of manual rewriting. Leveraging large language models (LLMs) for automated C-to-Rust translation has emerged as a promising direction. However, existing LLM-based approaches remain limited. On the one hand, LLMs exhibit limited capability in identifying Rust-specific rules, and inadequate handling of Rust syntax often results in incorrect translations. On the other hand, existing LLMs often struggle to accurately capture the semantics of complex code, resulting in incorrect translations. To address these challenges, we propose a Translation fRAmework Via rule-guided reasoning and rEinforcement Learning, namely TRAVEL, consisting of two modules. The first module employs Monte Carlo Tree Search (MCTS)-based reasoning path construction guided by Rust-specific rules, steering the search toward translation steps that respect the syntactic rules that LLMs frequently violate. The second module introduces reinforcement learning that couples execution feedback with reasoning-quality signals, encouraging the model to construct reasoning paths that accurately capture program semantics, thereby ensuring that the generated Rust code preserves the intended behavior of the original C program. We evaluate TRAVEL on three datasets: xCodeEval (a public benchmark), OS-Bench (functions collected from the Linux kernel), and HW-Bench (an industrial dataset from Huawei). On xCodeEval, TRAVEL outperforms all baselines across three backbone LLMs. In particular, compared to the strongest prompting baseline IRENE, TRAVEL improves computational accuracy (CA) by 26.22% and compilation success rate (CSR) by 18.77%. On HW-Bench and OS-Bench, TRAVEL further improves CSR by 18.28% and 16.51%, respectively, while reducing unsafe rate (UR) by 13.06% and 13.08%, respectively.

This paper presents LEAF, an instrumentation-based dynamic analysis framework for Rust. Although Rust has grown rapidly in recent years, the landscape of program analysis tools for Rust is still in relatively early stages. One notable gap is the lack of a general-purpose dynamic analysis framework that can support different analysis tasks. LEAF aims to fill this gap by providing a Rust-native framework for analyzing Rust programs at runtime. Rust provides rich semantic information through its ownership model, type system, memory model, and compiler-level representation. Therefore, LEAF focuses on how to make this information available to dynamic analyses. In particular, LEAF captures MIR-level semantic information, augments it with runtime facts, and delivers it to analyses as an event stream through Dynamic MIR (DMIR), an event-driven programming interface. Through three substantial dynamic analyses -- a concolic executor, a Rust-specific sanitizer, and a control-flow tracer -- we demonstrate the practicality and expressiveness of LEAF. Our evaluation further shows that LEAF's compile-time and runtime overhead is meaningful but manageable.

This paper presents LEAF, an instrumentation-based dynamic analysis framework for Rust. Although Rust has grown rapidly in recent years, the landscape of program analysis tools for Rust is still in relatively early stages. One notable gap is the lack of a general-purpose dynamic analysis framework that can support different analysis tasks. LEAF aims to fill this gap by providing a Rust-native framework for analyzing Rust programs at runtime. Rust provides rich semantic information through its ownership model, type system, memory model, and compiler-level representation. Therefore, LEAF focuses on how to make this information available to dynamic analyses. In particular, LEAF captures MIR-level semantic information, augments it with runtime facts, and delivers it to analyses as an event stream through Dynamic MIR (DMIR), an event-driven programming interface. Through three substantial dynamic analyses -- a concolic executor, a Rust-specific sanitizer, and a control-flow tracer -- we demonstrate the practicality and expressiveness of LEAF. Our evaluation further shows that LEAF's compile-time and runtime overhead is meaningful but manageable.